#Russia dnc server voting machines code
#Russia dnc server voting machines tv

Like burglars who pull the fire alarm and, in the ensuing chaos, ransack the cash register, the hackers entered through a hole of their own creation. Long before election night, attackers had uncovered a vulnerability in KnoxвЂ™s website - вЂњloosely written code,вЂќ Ball called it - and they timed the onslaught perfectly so they could exploit it during the scramble. It wasnвЂ™t until next morning, as IT staff began combing through server logs, that they discovered the true purpose of the attack: The DDOS, and the all-hands effort required to fight it, had been a diversion. But then the attack came roaring back throughout the night, BallвЂ™s team would battle it to the hilt. But it was natural for voters to wonder if the integrity of the vote itself had come under threat: вЂњItвЂ™s the first question they asked me,вЂќ Rodgers said.ДЄfter an hour, BallвЂ™s team managed to bring the server back to life finally, the results became visible. Rodgers would later explain to the media that the online precinct tally is unofficial: Attacking it canвЂ™t change the vote count, any more than hacking basketball scores on can change the actual winner of the NBA finals.

#Russia dnc server voting machines tv

IвЂ™ve never had three TV crews at one time,вЂќ Rodgers said, recounting how the chaos unspooled. One of them was Cliff Rodgers, the Knox County administrator of elections, who was deliberating what he should tell the local media. Finally, the barrage intensified so much that after 15 minutes, the server succumbed and crashed.Д«all was now besieged by callers - local politicos, voters, county staff.

The assault was being launched from 65 countries, a legion of zombie computers pressed into service by the attackвЂ™s architects.

#Russia dnc server voting machines code

One county technician, dumbfounded by the whoosh of code rocketing across the screen, somberly took out his phone and began to film it. Over at the countyвЂ™s IT center, вЂњthe error logs were coming so fast that you couldnвЂ™t even see what anything said,вЂќ recalled Ball. Technicians recognized the attack: a distributed denial of service, or DDOS, in which a server is overwhelmed by a crushing wave of requests, slowing it to a halt. вЂњLooks like a DDOS.вЂќ Ball still remembers his next, involuntary exclamation: вЂњOh, shit.вЂќ It was a message from a staffer, still on duty at the IT department: вЂњWeвЂ™ve got a problem here,вЂќ it read. It read simply, вЂњService Unavailable.вЂќ Across East Tennessee, thousands of Knox County residents who eagerly awaited the results saw the same error message - including at the late-night election parties for various county candidates, where supporters gathered around computers at KnoxvilleвЂ™s Crowne Plaza Hotel and the nearby Clarion Inn and Suites.Д«all was scowling at the screen when the phone on his table buzzed. Staring back at Ball was a proxy error notice, a gray message plastered against a screen of purgatorial white. Curious, Ball typed in the address for the Knox County election website.ДЄt 7:53, the website abruptly crashed. In a few minutes, at exactly 8 pm, the countyвЂ™s incoming precinct results would become visible to the public online. BallвЂ™s IT staff had finished a 14-hour day, running dress rehearsals to prepare for the ritual chaos of election night. One evening last May in Knoxville, Tennessee, during the night of the local primary election, Dave Ball, the assistant IT director for Knox County, settled into the Naugahyde chair of his dusty home office and punched away at his desktop computer.